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Abatract
In endogenoua growth theory the long-run economic expaneion is determined by in-
tertemporal preferencea for consumption, population growth and other factors, like for
inatance certain taxes. Here we focus on more aubtle and etrategic factors, like the will-
ingneea o( firma to internalize learning externalitiea, managerial diecretion baaed on the
aeparation between ownerahip and control, risk averaion and the trade-off between uncer-
tainty and growth. Following seminal work by Scott (1989) a theory ofendogenous growth
is developed atarting from a fundamental growth equation. Learning by doing and learn-
ing by watching are the main elemente behind this equation. It ia ahown that firma may
internalize the learning externality even under perfect competition. Moreover, firms may
maximize the growth rate aubject to a financial conatraint. However, in a macrceconomic
context the reault will depend on the way firms aet labour demand. Uncertainty haa a posi-
tive impact on growth, because of precautionary eavinga. The eflect is amplified i( projecta
with higher growth rates are more riaky.
'P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Nethetlands1
1 Introduction
The theory of economic growth is meant to explain long-run developments. As is well-known,
the neoclassical version of the theory is not fully satisfactory as it attributes long-term growth
to exogenous factors like technological change and population growth. Over the past seven
years a new theory was developed to overcome this deficiency of the standazd growth theory. In
endogenous growth theories, the long-run growth rate of the economy depends upon preferences
for consumption over time and parameters which relate to some "engine of growtb". Although
theoriea differ a great deal with respect to the specification ot the "engine of growthr, the
savinga rate holds a central position in all of them. Population growth is taken into account
in some theories but not in others. Moreover, population growth may induce accelerating
growth rates in theories where the "engine of growth" depends amonR other things on the
non-reproducible factor of production, e.g. labour.
From an intellectual point of view the new growth theory may be considered as an im-
provement vis-a-vis its predecessor as it explains more. However, a final assessment should
be based on empirical tests of both theories. For the time being there seems to be no clear
indication which theory is to be preferred. The problem with the empirical implementation
o( bot6 theories is that in the neoclaasical theory savings matter also during the process of
transition towarda a steady state. And such transition processes may take substantial time.
Growth theories aze set up to explore trends, but there may be shifts in long-run de-
velopments that mark different episodes in stories about growth. The developments of rich
economies from 1950 to roughly 1970 seem to be different from the more recent pattern of
economic growth. The productivity slow-down envisaged after 1970 is not well explained by
neoclassical growth theory, but the same verdict holds for the new growth theory as well (Scott,
1989). If so, there is need for extensions of the theory. Endogenous growth theory may be a
promising start, but at the same time not fully satisfactory as the theory ignores institutional
and organizational factora, which may prove important explanatory factors (e.g. Stern, 1991).
The relevance of these factors for understanding economic growth is most clearly revealed in
publications based on careful analysis of case studies. For instance, in Detouzos, Lester and
Solow (1989) the problem is stated in the (ollowing terms:
"Iforganizatiunal and attitudinal d~~ficiencios do indecd havc an important b~~aring
on American industrial perfonnance as our findings indicate, then a purely macroe-
conomic approach is insufficient. This is because there is no efficient market in
which organizational forms and attitudinal complexes compete with one another"
(PP. 38-39).
However, macroeconomic analysis is well-suited to deal with market imperfections. And a
number o( issues discussed in the quoted study may fall under this heading. The authors em-
phasize factors as the application of outdated strategies, short time horizons and technological
weaknesses in development and production in the US economy. To get a clear picture of what
is meant by these factors a descriptive approach is essential. Outdated strategies relate to a
focus on mass-production, which is superseded by developments in the market. A reorientation
of strategy is not easy because individual parts ot the traditional pattern cannot be replaced
piecemal. Short time horizons are closely connected to the organizational structure of capital
markets and the way executives' motives are linked to the financial result of the firm. Tech-
nological weaknesses may emerge if lower-risk investments dominate alternatives based on the
integration of product and process engineering, for example. Similar observations on corporate2
strategies, and managerial attitudes in the US economy over the recent period are made in
Porter (1990, Ch. 9).
Although theory inevitable implies abstraction, endogenous growth theory can be improved
by taking account ot some of the factors just mentioned. The present paper aims at a start
in that direction by extending a theory of endogenous growth along the lines set by Scott
(1989,1991) in several directions. Scott's theory based on learning by doing is discussed in
Section 2. What distinguishes this theory from other contributions in the field is its true dy-
namic character. The traditional static production function is substituted for an investment
programme contour, which makes the model very flexible and powerful. Learning externalities,
which are the topic of Section 3, fit easily into the framework. Internalization of the learning
externalities proves to be a feasible alternative for a market economy. In Section 4 it is assumed
that managers have some discretion with respect to the goals set for the firm. Growth max-
imization subject io consirainis is considered as an alternative for maximization of the value
of the firm. At this point the analysis bears some resemblance with the theory of managerial
economics (Marris, 1964, 1971), which did not receive the attention it deserved. This may be
due to the fact that it is a set up as a theory of the firm rather than as a theory of economic
growth. Uncertainty and growth is the subject of Section 5. Investment prograinmes have to
cope with uncertainty. A theory of growth can therefore not ignore the uncertainty connected
with the returns on investment. I{owever, from an analytical point of view it is difficult to
incorporate this aspect in a satisfactory manner, but that may be no excuse to eliminate un-
certainty as is standard practise in growth theory. Section 6 contains some conclusions and
suggestions for (urther research.
2 A theory of endogenous growth
The new theory ofeconomic growth o( Scott (1989, 1991) is based on a simple but powerful view
on the world. Ongoing production processes are seen as a heritage from the past. Increasesin
production can be brought about by changing production processes and by changing existing
economic arrangements, which requires investment outlays to be made. At the same time,
every transformation implies problem solving from which people learn. Therefore, as in Arrow
(1962) investment leads to learning by doing and the level of knowledge depends on accumulated
gross investment. Investment programmes build upon their predecessors. But this also implies
that investments have an "option value", which is defined in Myers (1984) as the present
value of future opportunities that will be opened up if the investment is made. Diminishing
returns to capital accumulation may be absent as investment opportunities are recreated by
undertaking investment and over time their average quality does not change very much for the
whole economy.
Investment leads to growth in output and change in employment. However, there may be
different options with respect to the labour saving character of investment programmes. Cost
consideration may induce firms to opt for investment programmes with more or less growth or
a decline of employment. Moreover there are diminishing retutns with respect to the rate of
investment. At any moment in time, firms have to choose from a set of investment projects
which are not equally profitable. The most profitable projects are chosen first and the larger
the rat~ of inv~stmcut thc lower th~, :werage quality of thi~ sclected proj~~cts. Ilowcwer, tho
average quality of the entire set of available investment opportunities does not dimiuish over
time because of learning by doing. Past investments then generate a set of possibilities which3
are captured by the fundamental growth function:





where g,gi and o denote the growth rate of output, the rate of change of employment and
the (gross) investment ratio. Equation (1) may be called a primitive (as in Romer, 1991), but
the same verdict applies to the neoclassical production function for which there is no etrict
need in a theory ot economic growth. To some extent, this modeling of (dynamic) production
opportunities resembles that of Romer (1986) where learning by doing keeps growth going and
where diminishing returns to the rate of investment are present due to convex adjustment
costs. However, the introduction of a dynamic growth equation makea it possible to analyse
some issues that can not be dealt with using the static production function, like the internalizing
of dynamic learning externalities in competitive markets (see Section 3 below).
The preference of households are given by an intertemporal utility function
~
U - f u(c;)e-Btdt
0
where c; denotes per capita cousumpt.ion and B denotes the pure rate of time preference. it is
convenient to assume a constant coefficient o[ relative risk aversion, p, so that the instantaneous
CRRA utility function can be written as
~-a c-
u(c~)- 1~-V
Market equilibrium implies that (aggregate) output (y) equals aggregate consumption (c) and
investment expenditure (i).
c-y-i-(1-a)y (2)
where o denotes the (macrceconomic) investment ratio. To concentrate on issues of sttategic
interaction only paths of balanced growth are taken into consideration. The more general case
where growth rates change over time is analysed in Van de Klundert and Meijdam (1991). It
is ahown there that the model has no transition dynamics in its standard setting, so that it is
fully justified to concentrate on steady state solutions.
Denoting the growth rate of output by g and that of per capita consumption by g~ we have
y - y(0)~` (3)
ct - c~(0)ea~i (4)
Asauming that thc population grows at the exogenous rate g„ we may writc g- g~ f g,,. The
model may be solved in a centralized or a decentralized version as in other theoriea of economic
growth (e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 1990).4
The centralized economy
In a planning approach the authorities choose o and g optimally so that per capita intertemporal
utility is maximized. Moreover they equate the growth of employment with the growth rate of
population (g~ - gn). Consequently, the ïollowing problem can be formulated
Max U - ~~ (c,l)1-ve-B~dt
0 1-p




Substituting the constraints, the integral can be solved to yield
U - r[y(~)~e(0)Jt -o` (1 - o)~-p
1` 1 - P lI B t (P - 1)[9(o~9n) - 9nJ
provided that (1 - p)(g- gn) - B ~ 0 which is a familiar condition (e.g. Koopmans, 1967). The
first-order condition 8U~8o - 0 implies
(1-v)~ó -[B}9n-~P(9-9n)J-9 (5)
Equation (5) implies that the proportionate marginal product of investment should be equal to
the difference between the rate of time preference in the ateady state (term in square brackets)
and the macroeconomic growth rate (g).
The optimal values of g and o follow from solving equations (1) and (5) assuming gi - gn.
The decentralized economy
In a market economy the saving and investment decisions are taken by consumers and producers
respectively. The capital market coordinates these decisions by equating supply and demand
at the equilibrium real rate of interest.
It will be assumed that managers maximize the present value of tlie representative firm.
Denoting the real wage by w, the cash flow of the firm is y- Cw - i-(1 - o)y - lw. In a
situation of balanced growth employment changes at rate g~ and real wages increase at rate
gw. Denoting the constant real rate of intereat by r, the present value (V) of the firm at t- 0
can then be written as
V - ~0~[(1 - v)y(0)es~ - l(0)eor~w(0)e9W~Je-'~dt
Integration of this equation for a constant o yields
V- tJ(O) Lr - 9- r-(9[ f 9w)J ~
(s)5
where a- l(0)w(0)~y(0) denotes the share of output accruing to labour in the initial situation.
It should be noticed that the steady state value of a is an endogenous variable. As there is
no transition dynamics the steady state value of a is attained by a euitable adjuetment in the
real wage rate, w. Firms maximize V with respect to the investment ratio (o) and the rate of
change of employment (gt). Maximization of V is constrained by the growth equation (1) so
we can replace g by g(o,gt). Moreover, initial output has to be taken as given because levels
cannot be changed without investing. To simplify y(0) is set at unity.
The first order conditions are
8V I 1- 0 8g -
80 --r-g}(r-9)~80 0
óV 1-0 8g a -0
89[ -(r - g)~ agt - Ir -(gt f gw)]~
-
Assuming that the economy exhibits balanced growth with g-gt - gw, so that a is constant,
results in:
(I-o)8o-r-9 (7)
(1 - o)a9t - ~ (8)
The optimum conditions (7) and (8) are easily interpretable. According to equation (7)
the proportionate marginal product of investment corrected for growth costs (measured by o)
should be equal to the growth corrected real rate of interest. Equation (8) implies that the
proportionate marginal product of labour again corrected for growth costs should be equal to
the share of labour in output. Equation (7) determinea the optimal amount of investment,
whereas the labour saving bias follows from equation (8).
Scott (1989) givea the fundamental growth equation (1) more structure by postulating that
thc function is linear homogenous in q(a) and gt, so that it can be written as
9- 9(o)Í [ 9t , with Í~ ~ 0 f~~ G 0
q(o) q'~0 q"GO q(0)-0 (9)
Equation (5), which is shown in Figure 1, is called the investment programme contour ('IPC').
Insert Figure 1 here.






where m - oq'~q (0 G~ G 1) is a measure of diminishing returns with respect to the investment6
ratio. The lower w the more severe diminishíng returns to investment are. Constant returns
to investment imply w- 1, but for a maximum of V one must have w G 1. Conditions (10)
and (11) are equivalent to equations (7) and (8). The specification preferred by Scott makea it
somewhat eaeier to derive compazative static results, showing the impact ofexogenous variablee
and parametets on long-run growth rates. However, before these reaulta can be discusaed the
model has to be closed by specifying consumere' behaviour and postulating equilibrium in
markets.
In a market economy, the representative and infinitely lived household maximizes the in-
tertemporal utility function of the CRRA-form as given above subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint by choosing the level of per capita consumption. The dynamic budget con-
straint can be written as
à~-wf(r-9~)a~-ct
w}iere a; denotes per capita nonhuman wealth. The non-consumed part of interest and labour
income adds to the stock of family wealth. A rise in the size of the household has a negative
effect on individual wealth because total household wealth must be shared by more persons.
The first order condition for the optimal consumption plan boils down to the well-known
Keynes-Ramsey rule
9c - ~~,~i - (r - B - 9n),~
Aggregation over individual consumers, whose number increases at rate g,,, gives the growth
rate ofaggregate consumption c~c - g~tgn. Equilibrium in the output market relates aggregate
consumption to output according to c- (1-o)y (equation (2) above). In a situation otbalanced
growth o and y~y - g are constant so that c~c - g and the Ramsey-rule can be rewritten as
r- B} gn f P(9 - 9n) (1`2)
'I'hc rate of intcrest equals thc rate of time preferenrc in thc situation of steady gmwth. Con-
cerning tbc labour markct, labour snpply is exogenous and incrcases at ratc g,,, assumiug a
constant participation rate ot the population. Labour market equilibrium requires:
9t - 9n (13)
As discussed in Van de Klundert and Meijdam (1991), this steady-state result obtains in case
of labout market clearing (zero unemployment) as well as in the case with some form of equi-
librium unemployment and hysteresis in the labour market. It should be noticed that market
equilibrium is defined in terms of flows and not necessarily in terms of stocks. All that is needed
is that the increase in output is sold and that the change in labour supply is absorbed in the
production process to the extent that the capacity utilization ratio and the unemployment rate
remain constant. From this point of view, it is obvious that the model may exhibit hysteresis
in levels as do many other endogenous growth models.
The complete market model comprises equations (9)-(13), solving for the endogenous vari-
ables g,gt,o,a and r. Comparing equations (7) and (12) with equation (5) for the centralized
economy points out that the decentralized and centralized outcomes ate equivalent, although
in the command economy there is no need to distinguish between labour income and capital
income so that r and a are not determined explicitly.7
A closed-form solution of the model is difficult to obtain, even after suitable apecification
of the IPC. In Table 1(first column) a numerical solution is preaented. The specification of
the IPC and the numerical value of the parametera chosen are presented in the Appendix.
Compazative static results can easily be derived as ehown in Van de Klundert and Meijdam





Moreover, if the slope of the IYC is sufficiently flat one has:
d~ ~0 d8 ~0
9n
"fhe mild conditions that havc to be irnposed on the IPC are discussed in Scott (1989) and are
legitímate from an empirical point of view. A rise in the growth rate of labour supply leads to
a higher growth rate of the economy and a fall in the share of output accruing to labour. An
increase in the subjective rate of discount has just the opposite effects: the growth rate (and
the investment ratio) decline and the share of labour in output rises. A numerical illustration
of the latter case is given iu Table 1(second column). If consumers have Iess patience the rate
of savings declines, which leads to lower investment and growth. 1'he shaze of labour rises,
because growth costs fall, so that the net proportionate marginal product of labour increases
on balance despite a shift towazds less labour saving projects as illustrated in Figure 1 by a
movement along the IPC from A to B.
liigher cost of capital pushes US firms in the direction of a shorter time horizon as Detouzos,
Lester and Solow (1989) argue in comparing the performance of the US economy with that
of its competitors. But there may be additional factors which exert a downward pressure on
growth rates in general. In the sections below the model will be extended to allow for further
perspectives in explaining economic growth.
Benchmark Increased time Learning by Internalizing the
preference watching learning externality
g 2.92qo 2.71qo 3.66qo 4.18qo
a 0.1652 0.1333 0.1739 0.2275
a 0.7608 0.7854 0.7626 0.7170
r 7.81q 9.27010 9.64qo 10.96010
' See Appendix for parameter choices.
3 The coordination perspective
To a large extent a firm's investment opportunitics are affected by its ability to Icarn from
investments undertaken by other firms. Learning by doing has to be supplemented with learn-
ing by watching (e.g. King and Robson, 1989). There is clearly an externality involved. The8
individual investor will not capture all the benefits resulting [rom his own investment, as they
accrue in part to other firms. However, if firms realize that they are in the same position
they may internalize the learning externality. As a result profits for all firma will be higher
than without internalization. If all firms maximize in this way there is no advantage in staying
behind. If no firm internalizes it is impossible to benefit from the externality. There is a coordi-
nation problem, which can only be solved by some outside factor. Forinstance, macrceconomic
stability may induce firms to take chances and go for the maximum.
The learning externality arising from learning by watching can be built into the model by
assuming that it reduces the degree oï diminishing returns of investment for the individual
company. I)enoting the individual firm's investment ratio by o and the investment ratio for






The multiplier z captures the effect of learning by watching.
Let us first consider the case that learning by watching is seen as an external effect. Firms
take the factor z for granted and from the firms' point of view, the marginal contributions
of investment and employment growth to the maximization of the value of the firm are not
in0uenced by the benefits from learning by watching. This implies that tho optimum conditions
are the same as in the model with only learning by doing aa presented in Section 2. Since all
firms are alike, one has o - a, and equations (9) and (10) apply. Howevet, the solution will be
differe.nt for z~ 1. Learning-by-watching raises the average return on investment. A higher
rate of interest makes households more thrifty, the investment ratio and growth rise along with
a decline in the share of labour in income.
Next, we consider the case of internalization of the learning externality. Firms identify o,
with o and take into account the effects of investment through learning by watching. As can
easily be checked the first order conditions for value maximization read in this case:
(1-o)(wf~)(9 - J~9t)-T-9, with (- z~a (15)
0 o z
(1 - o)Í~ - ~
lliminishing returns with respect to investment by firms are corrected by the elasticity ~. E'or a
proper solution one muat have: w t S C 1. With diminishing returns less severe, the investment
ratio and the growth rate of the economy will be higher. The condition for the bias in labour
saving is identical to the one in Section 2. This is a result of the specification of the IPC: the
function is linear homogenous in the learning externality and the growth rate of employment.
However, as the growth costs rise the share of labour has to go down in the present model.
The solution of the model for different cases is illustrated in Figure 2. The upward sloping
line represents the Keynes-Rainsey formula for intertemporal trade-off, equation (12). A higher
rate of growth must be bought at a higher rate of return on investment. The downward
sloping line gives the rate of return as a function of the growth rate. Such a"technology" line
can be obtained by combining the IPC equations (9) resp. (14) and the FOC condition for
optimal investment, equations (6) resp. (11) assuming that the labour market is in equilibrium
(9l - 9n). A rise in the investment ratio leads to a higher growth rate but the price to be paid9
is a lower profit rate as a result of diminishing returns with respect to both o and g~. The
line Tt relates to the learning-by-doing model. Learning by watching without internalization
gives rise to Tz, with internalization of the learning externality one gete the line T3. The more
possibiliticw [or investment are exploited, the higher the rate ot growth and the rate ofintorest.
Numerical examples corresponding to Figure 2 are given in Table 1. As appears trom the
third column in this table "learning by watching" increases all variables, although the rise in
1 is small. The economy is more productive, which raises income but the higher growth costs
reduce ceteria paribus the share of labour in output. Internalization of the learning externality
has a substantial effect on investment and growth, but at the expense of the shaze of labour as
growth costs increase significantly.
Insert Figure 2.
Leazning by watching is not an automatism as the theory almost inevitably suggests. In
fact, it dependa on the organization of industry and trade and the way firms take advantage of
these opportunities. Porter (1990) describes the world in the following manner:
"Competitive advantage emerges from close working relationships between world-
class suppliers and the industry. Suppliers help firms perceive new methods and
opportunities to apply new technology. Firms gain quick access to information, to
new ideas and insights, and to supplier innovations. They have the opportunity to
influence suppliers' technical efforts as well as serve as test sites for development
work. The exchange of RBï,D and joint problem solving lead to faster and more
efficient solutions. Suppliers also tend to be a conduit for transmitting information
and innovations from firm to firm. Through this process, the pace of innovation
within the entire national industry ia accelernted" (p. 103, italics added)
1'he analysis of the learning extcrnality emphasizes that economic growth cannot be ex-
plained adequately in mechanical terms. On the contrary, as Metcalfe (1991) observes in re-
viewing Scott's book: "maximization is trivial compared to the task of constructing the choice
set on which a maximization problem can be defined".
4 The managerial perspective
Managerial controlled fitms have discretionary power to pursue other goals than present value
maximization. As hypothesised by Marris ( 1964, 1971) such firms would seek to maximize
growth subject to constraints set by the capital market. In Marris (1964, Ch. 2) managerial
motivation is discussed extensively taking account of psychological, sociological and economic
motivea. However, the view is not undisputed. First, it may be questioned whether there is a
separation of ownership from control to the extent that managers have significant discretionary
power. Second, even if there is such power certain incentives may favour present-value max-
imization over alternatives as for instance maximization of the growth rate of the firm. It is
well-known that in the US management is rewarded through stock options and other profit-
related schemes, so that the incentive to maximize profits is strenghtened (e.g. Myers, 1984).
Deapite empirical research on thia issue, the questions raised are not yet settled t. There is a
~See for a discuesion of eome empirical etudiee Scott (7989, Ch. 9).lo
feeling among a number of authors that managerial control and deviations from present-value
maximization may be relevant for Europe or Japan, but less so for the US (e.g. Scott, 1989;
Detouzos et al., 1989).
It therefore makes sense to discuss the implications ofgrowth maximization in the framework
of the model ofendogenous growth of Section 2. Solow (1971) criticizes the managerial approach
and related growth-oriented theories for failing to establish the initial size of the firm as part
of the optimization problem. This critique dces not apply to our model as the level of output
is path-dependent. In the theory ofendogenous growth this is not an uncommon and perfectly
acceptable result ( e.g. Lucas, 1988). To concentrate on the issue of managerial diacretion as
such, learning externalities will now be ignored. Financial markets are ready to support the
management of a firm unless the present value of future cash flows will deviate too much from
the maximum attainable value. The gap (V,,,,~-V ) between the maximum attainable value and
the minimnm required value is an indication for the discretionary power of the management.
Managers maximize the growth rate of output (g) subject to the constraint on the value of the
firm (V ~ V). Aa a first step, V can be taken exogenous (with V C V a~) ~.
As it is easy to show that the constraint is always binding, the problem can be stated as
maximize
g- q(o)j I q~r )J
subject to
lll o
V - y(fl) 1-0 - ~ - V
r- 9 r-(gu, t gt)~
Setting y(0) - 1, the Lagrangian expression can be written as
gi 1 - o a
G- 9(o)Í
9(0) }~ r- g- r -(g~., t 9t) - V




(r - 9)~ - a - (1 - o)Í~
(9)
(16)
Elimination of the Lagrangian multiplier (~) and rearranging yields
f, ~ (o-Í~ár)-r-9 (17)
The result can be interpreted by comparing the value of the firm in case of value maximiza-
tion with the constrained value in case of growth maximization. Substitution of equation (11)
in equation (6), assuming steady state growth and y(0) - 1 gives
tn~a~ -
(1 - 0)(1 - f~)
r-g
zTo endogenize f~ a utílity function for managera with argumenta V and g can be introduced (ef. Marris,
1964)11
From ( 16) and balanced growth (g - gt f 9W) follows
v- 1-o-a
r-9
The existence of discretionary managerial power implies V G li,,,,~ or
Í'~(1-0)
Let a denote the difference between both sides of the inequality above. We then may write




As appears from these conditions in comparison with equation (10) aud (11) the manage-
rial modcl leads to a higher rate of growth and a higher share of output accruing to labour
than in the model with present-value maximization. The premium on marginal products, a,
corresponds to what Scott (1989) calls "animal spiritsr.
The managerial model can be completed by assuming that the supply of financial funds is
given by equation (12). There is no good reason to suppose that conaumers behave in a different
manner if there is a separation between ownership and control of firms. Further, it is again
assumed that the labour market is in equilibrium conform the definition given in Section 2.
The complete managerial model then comprises equations (9), (12), (13), (I6) and (17), which
solve for g,gt, a,o and r. A numerical example is presented in Table 2, column 2. The results
should be placed next to the outcomes of a benchmark case with present value maximization
given in column 1.
Value Managerial economy
maximization with premium on without premium on
labour demand labour demand
g 3.40010 3.43010 3.96q
0 0.1913 0.1941 0.3008
a 0.7439 0.7608 0.6476
r 9.02q 9.O6q 10.41q
V 1.155 0.8 0.8
a 0 0.0210 0.3021
' See Appendix for parameter choices.
Comparison of the results in columns 1 and 2 reveals that the managerial alternative to max-
imization of the value of the firm has a very amall impact on the growth rate of output even
if the constraint of the value of the firm is not very restrictive. The reason tor this perhaps
unexpected result is the macroeconomic constraint of labour market equilibrium. A higher rate12
o( growth leads ceteris paribus to a rising demand for labour, but the increase in labour supply
is exogenous in the model. Increased tension in the labour mazket induces a rise in the share of
income accruing to labour, so that firms aze under pressure to change towards relatively more
labour-saving investment projects. This contrasts with the outcomes of managerial theory,
which ate based on a micrceconomic setting.
However, the managerial approach may be introduced into the macro model in a different
way. It may be assumed that firms maximize the growth rate of output, but pay labour their
proportionate marginal product as in equation (11). This model variant implies that firms
attract labour to maximize the value of the firm, so that there aze ample financial means to
inveat and maximize growth. Under these assumptions the model comprises equations (9),
( I 1), (12), (13), (16) and (18) and solves for y, g~, a, a, r and a. The numerical outcomea of
this exercise are presented in column 3 of Table 2. As may be expected the growth rate is now
substantial higher than in a managerial model with a premium on the proportionate marginal
product of labour subject to the same financial constraint, as shown in the fifth line of the table.
The problem rises which of the two variants of the managerial economics is the most realistic.
Again there is a strategic element involved. It is in the common interest of all firms to pay
labour its proportionate mazginal product, because in that case the growth rate is the highest.
But individual firms may want to offer high wages and attract additional labour to grow faster.
Iiowever, from a macrceconomic perapective this behaviour is self defeatiug. In other words,
individual firms do not internalize the effects of their own wage offer on the macroeconomic
wage level. Like in the case of learning externalities, coordination among firms or something
like 'animal spirits' may lead to internalizing.
5 Growth under uncertainty
Usually firms operate in an uncertain outside world. These uncertainties relate to numerous
relevant aspects of business conditions and prospective changes in the economy as well as to
their consequences for the firm. As emphasized by Lintner (1971) in such a typical dynamic and
uncertain environment firms develop policies and strategies for growth. Firms tend to operate
in terms of expectations or targets of average growth rates for the considerable future together
with some assessment of the intensity of fluctuations around long-run averages. Formulating
a strategic poature in these terms is of course a composite summary of the assessment of the
more detailed environmental and competitive factors and the prospective success of firms in
coping with these factors. Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to envisage the strategic posture
of the firm in terms of both a time path of expected growth and also a measure of risk or
random variability about the expected trend. The basic policy decisions of firms can then be
regarded as choosing among alternative pairs of expected growth rates and levels of risk on
the one hand and fixing the desired intensity of labour-savings on the other hand. To simplify
matters these two basic decisions will be treated as unrelated.
As shown by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Gricr and Tullock (1989) there is a positive
relalion between growth rates and the variability of growth rates, which can be considered
as a measure of risk. Expected growth can be increased at a given rate of investment and
employment change only at the cost of a higher risk. The fundamental growth equation may
therefore be written aa
9 - 9(o,9t,rar) (20)13
where y denotes the expected rate of growth of output and var denotes the variance of the
growth rate. In addition to the conditions imposed in equation (1), we require 8g~8var ~ 0 and
8~g~8var~ G 0(cf. Figure 3). The associated actual growth rate g is a normally distributed
random variable with mean g and variance var.
Firms have to choose from a set of investment projects which are not equally risky. From
the projects with given growth and employment characterietics the least risky ones aze chosen
first. Hence at a larger rate of investment the firm has to accept ceteris paribua a higher risk
on the average project. Following Lintner (1971), a direct dependence between the average
riskiness (var) and the rate of investment (o) is postulated
var-vofv(o) v~~0 v'CO (21)
A larger investment ratio leads to a greater variability in growth rates. The constant vo is a
basic risk variable which can be chosen in an optimal way.
In this section we return to the case that shareholders, in their capacity as owners, determine
company policy and that managers have no incentives or possibilities to deviate from this policy.
Efficiency of stock and bonds markets will guarantee that in a market economy the value o[ the
firm, materialized in stock and bond prices and interest rates, reflects the preferences of the
investor, who is to be identified with our representative consumer. Managers are risk-neutral
and maximize the value of the firm. But, as the investor is risk averse, the cost of capital for
the firm is influenced by the risk-growth mix choosen. Hence, the growth strategy of the firm
has to take into account how consumers regard the trade-off between growth, risk and the rate
of return. To avoid lengthy derivations for stock prices, etc. we treat the consumers' and firms'
decisions as one single decision. This allows us to define an implicit real rate oí return that
would prevail in an efficient capital market.
The familiar intertemporal utility function of the CRRA-type is maximized. As the out-
comes of the growth process are uncertain, it is the expected value of discounted utility that
matters. The objection function can then be stated as:
~-P





Applying the standard formula for the expected value between accolades in the expresaion
for E(U) and substituting c; -(1 - o)y~l yields
~~y(0)~e(0))t-` 1 (1 - o)~-' (
E(U) - 1- P J B-} (P - 1)(9 - 9n) 22)
with
(P- 1)var 9-9- 2
(23)
denoting the certainty-equivalent of the growth rate of per capita consumption. It should be
notíced that in deriving eyuation (22) account is taken ot the aggregation relation g~ - 9- 9n.14
Maximization of equation (22) with reapect to o and vo and setting y(0)~l(0) - 1 for
convenience gives after some manipulations
(1 - o)~ó -[B f gn f P(9 - 9n)) - 9 (24)
8g - 0
8v~ (25)
Equation (24) corresponds to equation (5). Under uncertainty the proportionate marginal
product of investment ehould be equal to the rate of time preference minus the growth rate
both evaluated in terms of the certainty equivalent of the growth rate. Equation (25) implies an
optimal level of 'basic' risk that maximizes the certainty equivalent of the prospective growth
rate. Differentiation of equation (23) with respect to respectively o and vo taking equation
(21) into account results in
ay ag ag p-1 ,
áo-á~}~avar- 2 ~"




Combination of equations (23)-(27) leads to the followiug first order conditions for maximiza-
tion of the expected value of intertemporal utility
(1- o)ao - ef(v- 1)(9 - gn - P 2 lvar) (2s)
a9 p-1
a var - 2 (2s)
Equation (29) reflects the trade-off between the benefits and coste of a higher variance. In the
optimum, the marginal gain in the form of a higher growth rate should be equal to tl~e marginal
cost in the form of more risk which is disfiked by the investor. This condition is illustrated in
Figure 3 where the fundamental growth equation (20) with o and 9e fixed is tangent to the
indiffercnce curve l~ (derived from equations (22)-(23)).
Insert Figure 3 here.
The model can be closed by assuming labour market equilibrium.
9t - 9~ (30)
F;quilibrium in the labour market requires rompetitive wage settiug. Thc growth rate of labour
supply is exogenous, but employment growth can be derived from the familiar condition
(1 - o)a9r - ~
(31)15
Shareholdera value the contribution of employment growth on output growth in terms of the
certainty-equivalent g. However, because ~-~ condition (25) determines the optimal
labour-saving content of investment projecta. The complete model comprises equations (20),
(28), (29), (30) and (31), which solve for g,g~, o, oar and a. The real rate of interest is implicit
and can be set equal to
r-Bf9nfP(9-9n- 2 var 32 P- 1 ) ( )
It is interesting to compare the outcomea under uncertainty with the resulta obtained in
case of certainty. Comparison of equation (32) with equation (12) showa that the real rate of
interest is lower under under certainty, ceteris parióus. As a consequence the investment ratio
and the growth rate will be higher than under certainty. More savings are generated because
uncertainty creates an additional precautionary motive (see also Blanchard and Fischer, 1989,
Ch. 6). Consumers are risk averse and they opt for extra consumption in the future to
compensate for the poesibility of bad luck with respect to investment programmes. It should
be noticed that the optimal rate of growth will also be higher under uncertainty, because
shareholders exploit the trade-ofl between growth and risk in an optimal way. The level of risk
selected maximizes the certainty equivalent of the growth rate conditional on any investment
ratio as appears from equations (25) and (29) and from Figurc 3. The equilibrium rate of
intereat may theretore be liigher than under certainty. Uncertainty pays off in the form of
higher rates of return. This will of course not be the case if the expected rate of growth in
equation (20) is independent of the variance.
The two possibilities are illustrated numericaUy in Table 3. The benchmark caee is identical
to that in Table 2, and is not shown. The first column of Table 3 relates to the complete
model with uncertainty, whereas the aecond column gives aimulation results assuming ~- 0
and vo being exogenous. In the latter case there are no direct effecta ot uncertainty on the
average rate of growth. As appears from Table 3 uncertainty as such has only a small positive
impact on growth. The precautionary motive is rather weak. What makes a substantial
difference is the possibility to opt for higher growth rates at the expense of increased uncertainty
(e.g. Black, 1987, Ch. 10). To facilitate a comparison between uncertainty with and without
direct growth effects the basic risk level vo in the latter case is set at the endogenoua level
obtained in the former case. As a consequence, savings rates and variances do not differ very
much although growth rates do across those variants. However, the models refer to different
underlying realities, which hampers a comparison.
Uncertainty
with direct without direct direct growth effects
growth effects growth effects increased risk aversion
g 4.15oIo 3.41o!á 3.82q
0 0.2008 0.1918 0.1619
a 0.7358 0.7434 0.7680
r ]0.69"Ie R.R6~ 12.6501
- ~ See Appendix for parameter choices.
Altetnatively, it is instructive to test the sensitivity of the results for the degree of risk
aversion in the model with direct growth effects of uncertainty. A less tolerant attitude towardsls
riek leads to a slower rate of growth as shown in the third column of Table 3. The effect on
the growth rate ia much stronger than in models without uncertainty, because shareholders
trade-ofi growth for more certainty. In terms of Figure 3, increased risk aversion causes the
slope of the indifference curves to rise and a point like B is chosen. The variance declines
substantially as shown in the table. The (implicit) rate of interest rises as households reduce
savings, so that diminishing returns to investment bite less.
6 Conclusions
The analysis presented is based on two main ideas. First, long-run economic growth is endoge-
nous. Our theory therefore fits into the new growth theory as developed recently. It deviates
from this theory by introducing a(undamental growth equation as substitute for the tradi-
tional production function. Second, economic growth is strongly influenced by institutional
and strategic factors. To deal with these factors it is necessary to have a flexible theory of
economic growth, which is precisely what the approach chosen here aimes at.
Learning externalities, managerial discretion and uncertainty of returns to investment are
incorporated in a model of economic growth, which builds upon the seminal work of Scott
(1989). At some instances there is room for strategic behaviour of entrepreneurs in the tradi-
tional sense. The outcomes of the activities of the individual entrepeneur depend in that case
on the activities of all others. There is strategic interaction (e.g. Cooper and John, 1988), so
that waves of optimism or pessimism may make a large difference in outcomes. The concept oí
strategies for growth may however be given a broader meaning. The institutional set-up of the
economy is man-made and may fasten or hamper growth. This idea is documented extensively
in Detouzos et al. (1989) with application to the United States. It is against this background
that we summarise our main results in the form of a relatively pessimistic growth scenario,
which shows how the combination of certain institutional features can impede the potential for
growth in a serious manner.
Communication between firms is bad, so that the possibiGties for leaniing by watching are
not fully exploited. Moreover, firms do not internalize the externalities that remain, because
there is insufficient trust that others will do the same. The organization of the capital market
leaves not much room for managerial discretion and maximization of growth rates. Even when
there is some separation of ownership trom control the effects on growth rates are modest
as managers compete excessively for workers on a tight labour market. The capital market
is organized in such a way that risk discourages investment. The precautionary motive for
savings, which may lead to higher growth rates under uncertainty, is cut out. Moreover, risk
aversion is relatively strong.
Taken together these factors may have a substitutional impact on the long-run rate of
economic growth given the (undamentals of the models. The message of the paper is therefore
that the theory of economic growth can and should gain by incorporating institutional and
organizational aspects of existing economies. Topicsfor ïurther research in this area are easily
traced. Capital markets are often complex and we have only scratched the surface. Labour
market issues may be of importance too. Rent-seeking and rent-sharing activities need to be
given proper attention. The new growth theory may deal with these and related issues by
postulating a fundamental growth equation as a point of departure.17
Appendix
The specification of the IPC (equation (9) or (14)) used in the tables is as follows:
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F,quation (21) is specified as
~- r y. - y ~a
`e7~o - 1 etio - 1
var - vo t vt f
The specification of q(o) and f(.) are taken from Scott (1989, pp. 214 and 179). The specifica-
tion of z(o,) is chosen in such a way that there is no externality (or full internalizing) if y, - y
and there is a positive learning externality if y, c y. The parameters in the J(.)-function are
based on Scott's data set for the postwargrowth experience of ten OF.CD countries. The choice
of the other parameters is shown below. The variance in Table 3 is calibrated to 0.0009. This
means a standard deviation of 0.03 which corresponds roughtly to empirical findings from the
Summers and Heston (1991) data set for the 80 richest countries. 3
Table 1 Table 2 Table 3
y 8,8,8,4 6 6
y, 8,8,4,4 6 6
p 2.5 2.5 2.5, 2.5, 3.5
y~~ 0 0 0.1361, 0, 0.1361
vo 0 0 ', 0.00045,'
vr 0 0 0.001
B 0.02, 0.04, 0.02, 0.02 0.02 0.02
g„ 0.01 0.01 0.01
' endogenous
~We thank Ton van Schaik for providing us with the variancea of growth rates.18
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